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Abstract
We present new differentially private algorithms for learning a large-margin halfspace. In
contrast to previous algorithms, which are based on either differentially private simulations of
the statistical query model or on private convex optimization, the sample complexity of our
algorithms depends only on the margin of the data, and not on the dimension.
1 Introduction
In a classification problem, we are given labeled examples from some unknown distribution, and
the goal is to learn a classifier that accurately labels future examples from the same distribution.
In many applications, each of these examples represents the highly sensitive privacy information of
some individual. Although the goal of classification is to learn about the distribution, and not about
the examples per se, many natural learning algorithms have the unfortunate side effect of revealing
all or part of some of the labeled examples. For example, support vector machines represent the
learned classifier as a set of support vectors, which are just labeled examples from the input!
The now-standard approach for ensuring privacy in machine learning is differential privacy
(DP) [Dwork et al., 2006], which, informally, requires that no individual labeled example in the input
significantly influences the learned classifier. Starting with some of the earliest work in differential
privacy [Blum et al., 2005, Kasiviswanathan et al., 2008], there is a large body of literature showing
that nearly every classification problem can be solved with differential privacy, albeit with large
overheads in both sample complexity and running time. It is thus central to understand for which
problems these overheads can be eliminated, and for which they are inherent.
In this paper we study the classical problem of learning a large-margin halfspace. That is, the
examples are unit vectors x ∈ Rd labeled with y ∈ {±1}, and we assume that y = sign(〈w,x〉)
for some unknown unit vector w ∈ Rd. Further, no example falls too close to the boundary of the
halfspace, meaning that y · 〈w,x〉 ≥ γ, where γ is called the margin. When d is large, assuming a
large margin enables learning the halfspace with sample complexity independent of d.
Many results in differential privacy either explicitly or implicitly give private algorithms for
learning a large-margin halfspace (see the related work for a detailed discussion). Blum et al. [2005]
gave a differentially private implementation of the classical Perceptron algorithm for learning a
large-margin halfspace, however their implementation requires sample complexity poly(d), which is
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Sample Complexity Running Time Privacy
Theorem 2 1αεγ2 poly(d,
log(1/βδ)
αεγ ) (ε, δ)
Theorem 4 1
αεγ2
2O˜(1/γ
2) · poly(d, log(1/βδ)αε ) (ε, 0)
Table 1: Sample complexity and running time bounds for our algorithms. For simplicity, each of
these bounds suppresses polylogarithmic factors of α, β, ε, δ, γ.
precisely what the large-margin assumption is meant to avoid. A distinct line of work, beginning
with Chaudhuri et al. [2011], studies differentially private algorithms for empirical loss minimiza-
tion problems. Although learning a large-margin halfspace can be achieved via minimizing the
Hinge loss, generic algorithms for differentially private loss minimization inherently require poly(d)
samples [Bun et al., 2014, Bassily et al., 2014].
1.1 Results
In this work we give two new differentially private algorithms for learning a large margin halfspace.
The key feature of our algorithms is that the sample complexity depends only on the margin, the
desired accuracy of the learner, and the desired level of privacy, and not on the dimension. More
precisely, our sample complexity is (ignoring constants and logarithmic factors) 1/αεγ2 where α is
the desired error and ε is the desired privacy. In contrast, without privacy the sample complexity
is roughly 1/αγ2, so our sample complexity is comparable to that of non-private algorithms except
when ε is very small.
Our first algorithm runs in polynomial time in all the parameters and satisfies the standard
notion of (ε, δ)-DP. Our second algorithm’s running time grows exponentially in the inverse-margin
1/γ, but the algorithm satisfies the very strong special case of (ε, 0)-DP (so-called pure DP). Our
results are described in more detail in Table 1.
The main technique in both of our algorithms is to use random projections to reduce the dimen-
sionality of the space to ≈ 1/γ2. After projection, we can learn using either a differentially private
algorithm for minimizing Hinge loss or by using the exponential mechanism over a net of possible
halfspaces. We note that using either of these techniques on its own, without the projection, would
fail to find an accurate classifier without poly(d) samples.
We also prove a lower bound showing that any (ε, 0)-differentially private algorithm for learning
a large-margin halfspace (with constant classification error) requires Ω(1/εγ2) samples (unless d =
o(1/γ2)). This lower bound is presented in Theorem 6.
1.2 Related Work
Blum et al. [2005] gave a differentially private implementation of the classical Perceptron algo-
rithm, based on a general differentially private simulation of algorithms in the statistical queries
model [Kearns, 1993]. Their algorithm can be improved using more recent statistical queries algo-
rithms by Feldman et al. [2017], but this approach still requires poly(d) samples. The foundational
work of Kasiviswanathan et al. [2008] studied differentially private PAC learning, and gave a generic
private PAC learner, but they did not consider margin-based learning guarantees.
An alternative approach is to leverage algorithms for differentially private convex optimizing to
identify a halfspace minimizing the Hinge loss. Differentially private convex optimization is now
the subject of a large body of literature that is too large to survey here. Notably Bassily et al.
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[2014] gave nearly optimal algorithms for private convex optimization in the relevant setting, and
showed that such algorithms necessarily require poly(d) samples. A work of Jain and Thakurta
[2014] gave nearly dimension-free results for minimizing generalized linear models, which could be
used for learning a large-margin halfspace, however the sample complexity obtained by using these
results would necessarily be significantly worse than ours.
Blum et al. [2008] gave an algorithm for the related query release problem for large-margin
halfspaces—they construct a differentially private algorithm that outputs a data structure such
that one can input a halfspace such that if the data has large margin with respect to that halfspace,
then the structure outputs an estimate of how many points are labeled positively. One could use such
a data structure to learn a large-margin halfspace, however, their algorithm has sample complexity
poly(d), and the resulting learning algorithm would also not be computationally efficient.
Similar to our work, there have been other applications of random projections in differential
privacy. One example is the above query release algorithm from Blum et al. [2008], which is con-
ceptually similar to our purely differentially private algorithm. In a very different setting, the work
of Blocki et al. [2013] demonstrated that certain random projection matrices automatically preserve
privacy, however there is no technical relationship between their results and ours. Kenthapadi et al.
[2012] also used the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform to achieve better utility and computational ef-
ficiency for privately estimating distances between users, but again there is no technical relationship
between their results and ours.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Learning Halfspaces
We consider a distribution D over X × {±1}, where X ⊆ Rd. We denote by Bd2 the ball in Rd with
center 0 and radius 1 with respect to the euclidean norm ‖ · ‖2. We assume that all examples are
normalized so that X = Bd2 .
A linear threshold function is defined as fw,θ(x) = sign(〈w,x〉 − θ), where x,w ∈ Rd and θ ∈ R.
We assume without loss of generality that θ = 0 so fw(x) = sign(〈w,x〉).1
We call a vector w a hypothesis. The error of a threshold function defined by hypothesis w on
distribution D is
errD(fw) = Pr
(x,y)∼D
[fw(x) 6= y] = Pr
(x,y)∼D
[sign(〈w,x〉) 6= y] = Pr
(x,y)∼D
[y · 〈w,x〉 < 0].
As in the PAC learning model, introduced by Valiant [1984], where PAC stands for probably
approximately correct, the goal is to find a hypothesis w such that errD(fw) ≤ α with probability
at least 1 − β, for given parameters α and β. We assume that there exists a hypothesis with zero
error, that is, there exists a w∗ ∈ Bd2 such that y · 〈w∗,x〉 > 0 ∀(x, y).
More specifically, we assume that w∗ maximizes the margin, which is defined as
γ = min
x∈X
|〈w∗,x〉|
‖w∗‖2 · ‖x‖2 .
Equivalently, γ ≤ | cos(w∗,x)| ∀x, where the right hand side is the distance of a scaled point x from
the halfspace 〈w∗,x〉 = 0. It follows that γ ∈ (0, 1] and it is assumed that γ is known in advance.
1We can simulate a non-zero threshold by letting x˜ = [x, 1], running the algorithm with the scaled margin, and
returning fw,−wd+1 , where w˜ = [w, wd+1] is the output of the algorithm. This would only increase the dimension of
the space by 1.
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Our goal is to design algorithms which, given enough data points drawn from a distribution D
over a linearly separable set with margin γ, return a hypothesis which has error at most α with
respect to the distribution, with probability at least 1 − β. More formally, we aim to design an
(α, β, γ)-PAC learner with low sample complexity.
Definition 2.1 ((α, β, γ)-PAC learner). Let D be a distribution over Bd2 × {±1} such that there
exists w∗ ∈ Bd2 for which
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[y〈w∗,x〉 ≥ γ] = 1.
We call such a distribution D a distribution with margin γ.
An algorithm A is an (α, β, γ)-PAC learner for halfspaces in Rd with margin γ and sample
complexity n if, given a sample set S ∼ Dn from any distribution D with margin γ, it outputs a
classifier A(S) = wˆ ∈ Bd2 such that
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[y = sign(〈wˆ,x〉)] ≥ 1− α
holds with probability at least 1− β.
2.2 Differential Privacy
We design algorithms which draw a sample set S and output a hypothesis w ∈ Rd. In addition
to finding a good hypothesis, our algorithms must satisfy differential privacy (DP) guarantees.
Differential privacy is a property that a randomized algorithm satisfies if its output distribution
does not change significantly under the change of a single data point.
More formally, let S, S′ ∈ Sn be two data sets of the same size. We say that S, S′ are neighbors,
denoted as S ∼ S′, if they differ in at most one data point.
Definition 2.2 (Differential Privacy, Dwork et al. [2006]). A randomized algorithm A : Sn → O is
(ε, δ)-differentially private if for all neighboring data sets S, S′ and all measurable O ⊆ O,
Pr[A(S) ∈ O] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[A(S′) ∈ O] + δ.
Algorithm A is (ε, 0)-differentially private if it satisfies the definition for δ = 0.
A useful property of differential privacy is that it is closed under post-processing.
Lemma 1 (Post-Processing, Dwork et al. [2006]). Let A : Sn → O be a randomized algorithm that is
(ε, δ)-differentially private. For every (possibly randomized) f : O → O′, f ◦A is (ε, δ)-differentially
private.
3 An Efficient Private Algorithm
Both the algorithm of this and the next section draw a sample set S ∼ Dn and perform dimension
reduction from a d-dimensional to an m-dimensional space, which allows them to run in the reduced
space for the remainder of the execution.
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Algorithm 1 Aα,β,ε,δ,γ(S)
1: Choose a random matrix A ∈ Rm×d, where m = O
(
log(1/βJL)
γ2
)
, βJL = αβ
2/64n, and
Aij =
{
+1/
√
m w.p. 1/2
−1/√m w.p. 1/2
2: Define SA ← {(Ax/‖Ax‖2, y) | (x, y) ∈ S}.
3: Define the hypothesis set C ← Bm2 .
4: Define the 10086γ -Lipschitz loss function ℓ : C × (Bm2 × {±1})→ R as
ℓ(w; (x, y)) = 1
{
y · 〈w,x〉 < 96γ
100
}
·
(
96
86
− y · 〈w,x〉
86γ/100
)
.
5: Let wˆ← F(SA, ℓ, (ε, δ), C).
6: Return wˆ⊤A.
Algorithm F is any differentially private empirical risk minimization algorithm. It takes as
input a sample set D, a loss function ℓ with Lipschitz constant L, differential privacy parameters
(ε, δ), and a convex hypothesis space C, and returns a hypothesis with low empirical risk on the
sample set D. We can instantiate algorithm F with the noisy stochastic gradient descent algorithm
of Bassily et al. [2014] so that it has the following guarantee. The full algorithm is presented in
Appendix A for completeness.
Theorem 1 (Bassily et al. [2014]). There exists an algorithm F that is (ε, δ)-differentially private
and returns a hypothesis wˆ for which, with probability at least 1− β/4, it holds that
L(wˆ;D)− min
w∈C⊆Rm
L(w;D) =
√
mL‖C‖2
ε
· polylog
(
n,
1
β
,
1
δ
)
, (1)
where L(w;D) = ∑
(x,y)∈D
ℓ(w; (x, y)) is the total loss of a hypothesis w on the data set D.
For the following proofs, we denote xA :=
Ax
‖Ax‖2 for any x ∈ Bd2. It holds that xA ∈ Bm2 and the
modified sample set can be also written as SA = {(xA, y) | (x, y) ∈ S}.
The lemma that follows guarantees that the transformation of a point x 7→ Ax, with high
probability, only changes its euclidean norm by a small multiplicative factor.
Lemma 2 (Distributional Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma, Achlioptas [2003]). Let A ∈ Rm×d be a
random matrix such that m = O
(
log(1/βJL)
γ2
)
and
Aij =
{
+1/
√
m w.p. 1/2
−1/√m w.p. 1/2
Then, for every x ∈ Rd, it holds that:
Pr
A
[∣∣‖Ax‖22 − ‖x‖22∣∣ ≤ γ100‖x‖22
]
≥ 1− βJL
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Since the transform leaves the norm of a point x almost unchanged, one would expect that
the corresponding transformed and normalized hypothesis w∗A := Aw
∗/‖Aw∗‖2 would still have a
large enough margin with respect to the corresponding point xA. The following lemma defines the
probability that a point x belongs in the set of points GA, which are “good” for a fixed matrix A, in
the sense that their norm remains almost unchanged and the margin of their corresponding points
xA from w
∗
A is close to the original.
Lemma 3. For every given matrix A, let GA ⊆ X ×{±1} be the set of data points (x, y) that satisfy
the following two statements:
(i)
∣∣‖Ax‖22 − ‖x‖22∣∣ ≤ γ100‖x‖22 and
(ii) w∗A =
Aw∗
‖Aw∗‖2 has margin at least 96γ/100 on (xA, y), i.e. y · 〈w∗A,xA〉 ≥ 96γ/100.
It holds that
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) ∈ GA] ≥ 1− 4βJL.
For the proof of Lemma 3, we express an inner product as 〈w∗,x〉 = 14‖ x+w∗‖22− 14‖ x−w∗‖22
and use the guarantee of the Distributional Johnson-Lindenstrauss Lemma on vectors x,w∗,x −
w
∗,x+w∗. By union bound, we get that with probability at least 1−4βJL, xA has margin 96γ/100
with respect to w∗A. The proof is in Appendix A.
In the following, we provide the privacy and sample complexity guarantees of our algorithm.
Theorem 2 (Sample complexity). Algorithm Aα,β,ε,δ,γ is an (α, β, γ)-learner with sample complexity
n =
1
αεγ2
· polylog
(
1
α
,
1
β
,
1
δ
,
1
ε
,
1
γ
)
.
Proof of Theorem 2. The first step of the algorithm is to sample matrix A uniformly at random
from U =
{
± 1√
m
}m×d
. From Lemma 3, it follows that E
A
[
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) /∈ GA]
]
≤ 4βJL. And, by
Markov’s inequality,
Pr
A
[
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) /∈ GA] ≥ β′
]
≤
E
A
[
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) /∈ GA]
]
β′
≤ 4βJL
β′
.
We set β′ = αβ/4n. Then, substituting βJL = αβ
2
64n , we get that with probability at least 1−β/4,
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) ∈ GA] ≥ 1− β′. (2)
Therefore, with probability 1 − β/4, the sampled matrix A satisfies inequality (2), that is, a
point (x, y) ∼ D is in GA with probability at least 1−β′. Furthermore, by union bound, ∀(x, y) ∈ S
it holds that (x, y) ∈ GA, with probability at least 1− nβ′ ≥ 1− β/4.
For the remainder of the proof, we condition on the event that:
1. Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) ∈ GA] ≥ 1− β′ holds for A and
2. S ⊆ GA, that is, w∗A has margin at least 96γ/100 on SA.
This event occurs with probability at least 1− β/4 − β/4 = 1− β/2.
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Claim 2.1. If n = 1αεγ2 · polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
δ ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
, then for the hypothesis wˆ returned by F , with
probability 1− β/4, it holds that
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
≤ α
4
. (3)
Proof of Claim 2.1. Since w∗A has margin at least 96γ/100 for all points in SA, it holds that
min
w∈C
L(w;SA) ≤ L(w∗A;SA) = 0. Substituting ‖C‖2 = 2, L = 100/86γ, and m = O
(
log(n/αβ)
γ2
)
into (1), dividing by n, and simplifying the expression, we get that with probability at least 1−β/4,
1
n
L(wˆ;SA) = 1
nεγ2
· polylog
(
n,
1
α
,
1
β
,
1
δ
)
. (4)
It also holds that:
1
n
L(wˆ;SA) = 1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < 96γ
100
}
·
(
96
86
− y · 〈wˆ,xA〉
86γ/100
)
≥ 1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
By the latter and inequality (4), it follows that with probability at least 1− β/4,
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
=
1
nεγ2
· polylog
(
n,
1
α
,
1
β
,
1
δ
)
.
Therefore, for n = 1
αεγ2
· polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
δ ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
with probability at least 1− β/4,
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
≤ α
4
.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 2.2. If n = 1αεγ2 · polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
δ ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
, then with probability 1 − β/2, the error of the
returned classifier wˆ⊤A on distribution D is
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[y · 〈wˆ⊤A,x〉 < 0] ≤ α. (5)
Proof of Claim 2.2. Let DA denote the probability distribution with domain Bm2 ×{±1}, from which
a sample (xA, y) ∈ SA is drawn. Let us also denote by D|GA distribution D restricted on GA. In
our conditioned probability space, SA ∼ DnA, where the probability density function of DA would
be defined as
Pr
(xA,y)∼DA
[xA = x
′ ∧ y = y′] = Pr
(x,y)∼D|GA
[
Ax
‖Ax‖2 = x
′ ∧ y = y′
]
.
Let H = {h : {xA | (x, y) ∈ GA} → {±1} s.t. h(x) = sign(〈w,x〉) for some w ∈ Bm2 } be a con-
cept class of threshold functions in Bm2 . By Theorem 3.4 of Anthony and Bartlett [2009], VCdim(H) =
m+ 1.
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By the generalization bound of Theorem 5.7 of Anthony and Bartlett [2009], it holds that:
Pr
SA∼DnA

∃h ∈ H : errDA(h) > 2 · 1n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1{h(xA) 6= y}+ α
4

 ≤ 4ΠH(2n) exp(−αn/32)
where the growth function ΠH(2n) ≤ (2n)m+1 +1, by Theorem 3.7 of Anthony and Bartlett [2009].
Usingm = O
(
log(1/αβ)
γ2
)
, it holds that if n = 1
αγ2
·polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
γ
)
then 4ΠH(2n) exp(−αn/32) ≤
β/4. Therefore, with probability at least 1− β/4,
errDA(fwˆ) ≤ 2 ·
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1{y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < 0}+ α
4
(6)
By Claim 2.1, 1n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1{y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < 0} ≤ 1n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ10
} ≤ α4 holds with
probability 1− β/4, if n = 1
αεγ2
· polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
δ ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
.
Therefore, by inequality (6), if n = 1
αεγ2
· polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
δ ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
, then with probability at least
1− β/4− β/4 = 1− β/2,
errDA(fwˆ) ≤ 2 ·
α
4
+
α
4
=
3α
4
.
Equivalently, with probability at least 1− β/2,
Pr
(x,y)∼D|GA
[y · 〈wˆ⊤A,x〉 < 0] = Pr
(xA,y)∼DA
[y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < 0] = errDA(fwˆ) ≤
3α
4
.
Since, by Condition 1., Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) /∈ GA] ≤ β′ ≤ α4 , it follows that with probability at least
1− β/2,
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[y · 〈wˆ⊤A,x〉 < 0] ≤ Pr
(x,y)∼D|GA
[y · 〈wˆ⊤A,x〉 < 0] · (1− β′) + 1 · β′
≤ 3α
4
· (1− β′) + β′
≤ 3α
4
+
α
4
≤ α.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Accounting for the probability that we are not in the conditioned space, we conclude that if
n = 1
αεγ2
·polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
δ ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
, then with probability at least 1−β/2−β/2 = 1−β, errD(fwˆ⊤A) ≤ α.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 3 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm Aα,β,ε,δ,γ is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemma 1, (ε, δ)-differential privacy is closed under post-processing. There-
fore it suffices to show that an algorithm N that is the same as Aα,β,ε,δ,γ except that it returns wˆ
instead of wˆ⊤A, is (ε, δ)-DP.
Let S and S′ be two neighboring data sets such that S = S′ \ {(x′, y′)} ∪ {(x, y)}. Let U ={
± 1√
m
}m×d
. If we fix a matrix A ∈ U , the sample sets S and S′ would correspond to F ’s inputs
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SA and S
′
A = SA \ {(x′A, y′)} ∪ {(xA, y)}, respectively. Recall from Theorem 1, that algorithm F is
(ε, δ)-DP.
For any measurable set R ⊆ Rm, it holds that
Pr[N (S) ∈ R] =
∑
A∈U
Pr[A] · Pr[F(SA) ∈ R | A]
≤
∑
A∈U
Pr[A] · (exp(ε) Pr[F(S′A) ∈ R | A] + δ) (by Theorem 1)
= exp(ε)
∑
A∈U
Pr[A] · Pr[F(S′A) ∈ R | A] + δ
∑
A∈U
Pr[A]
= exp(ε) Pr[N (S′) ∈ R] + δ.
Therefore, N is (ε, δ)-DP, and so is Aα,β,ε,δ,γ.
4 A Purely Differentially Private Algorithm
As previously, algorithm Aα,β,ε,γ takes as input a sample set S ∼ Dn and performs dimension
reduction from the d-dimensional space to an m-dimensional space. In this reduced space, the
algorithm defines a net of hypotheses and uses the Exponential Mechanism [McSherry and Talwar,
2007] to choose a good hypothesis with respect to the sample set.
The Exponential Mechanism is a well-known algorithm, which serves as a building block for
many differentially private algorithms. The mechanism is used in cases where we need to choose the
optimal output with respect to some utility function on the data set. More formally, let O denote
the range of the outputs and let u : Sn ×O → R be the utility function which maps the data set -
output pairs to utility scores.
An important notion in differential privacy is that of the sensitivity of a function. Intuitively, it
represents the maximum change that the change of a single data point can incur on the output of
the function, and as a result, it drives the amount of uncertainty we need in order to ensure privacy.
The sensitivity of the utility function, which is only with respect to the data set, is defined as
∆u = max
o∈O
max
S,S′∈Sn
S∼S′
|u(S, o)− u(S′, o)|.
Definition 4.1 (Exponential Mechanism, McSherry and Talwar [2007]). Let data set S ∈ Sn, range
O, and utility function u : Sn × O → R. The Exponential Mechanism ME(S, u,O) selects and
outputs an element o ∈ O with probability proportional to exp
(
ε·u(S,o)
2∆u
)
.
The Exponential Mechanism has the following guarantees.
Lemma 4 (Privacy and Accuracy of the Exponential Mechanism, McSherry and Talwar [2007]).
The Exponential Mechanism is (ε, 0)-differentially private and with probability at least 1− δ
|max
o∈O
u(S, o)− u(ME(S, u,O))| ≤ 2∆u
ε
ln
( |O|
δ
)
.
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Algorithm 2 Aα,β,ε,γ(S)
1: Choose a random matrix A ∈ Rm×d, where m = O
(
log(1/βJL)
γ2
)
, βJL = αβ
2/64n, and
Aij =
{
+1/
√
m w.p. 1/2
−1/√m w.p. 1/2.
2: Define SA ← {(Ax/‖Ax‖2, y) | (x, y) ∈ S}.
3: Let W be a γ10−Net of Rm.
4: Define the utility function u : (Bm2 × {±1})n ×W → [−1, 0]:
u(D,w) = − 1
n
·
∑
(x,y)∈D
1
{
y · 〈w,x〉 < γ
10
}
.
5: wˆ←ME(SA, u,W)
6: return wˆ⊤A.
In the following we provide the sample complexity and privacy guarantees of our algorithm.
Theorem 4 (Sample Complexity). Algorithm Aα,β,ε,γ is an (α, β, γ)-learner with sample complexity
n =
1
αεγ2
· polylog
(
1
α
,
1
β
,
1
ε
,
1
γ
)
.
The proof of Theorem 4 is very similar to that of the previous section, except for the bound on
the empirical loss of the learned classifier. We prove this part here, and the full proof can be found
in Appendix B.
Claim 4.1. If n = 1
αεγ2
·polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
, then with probability 1−β/4, for hypothesis wˆ returned
by the Exponential Mechanism it holds that
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
≤ α
4
. (7)
Proof of Claim 4.1. Every point in Bm2 is within γ/10 from a center of W. Let w∗c be the center
within γ/10 from w∗A, that is,
‖w∗A −w∗c‖2 ≤ γ/10. (8)
Recall that in our conditioned probability space,
y · 〈w∗A,xA〉 ≥ 96γ/100 (9)
holds for all (xA, y) ∈ SA. Therefore, for all (xA, y) ∈ SA,
y · 〈w∗c ,xA〉 = y · 〈w∗A,xA〉 − y · 〈w∗A −w∗c ,xA〉
≥ y · 〈w∗A,xA〉 − ‖w∗A −w∗c‖2 · ‖xA‖2
≥ 96γ/100 − γ/10 = 86γ/10 > γ/10. (by inequalities (8), (9))
It follows that
max
w∈W
u(SA,w) ≥ u(SA,w∗c) = −
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈w,xA〉 < γ
10
}
= 0. (10)
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By Lemma 4 and inequality (10), with probability at least 1− β/4, it holds that:
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
≤ 2
nε
(ln(|W|) + ln(4/β)) (11)
It is a well-known result that the covering number of an m-dimensional unit ball by balls of
radius γ/10 is at most O
((
1
γ/10
)m)
. Therefore, substituting m = O
(
log(n/αβ)
γ2
)
, it follows that
ln |W| = 1
γ2
· polylog
(
n,
1
α
,
1
β
,
1
γ
)
.
Thus, by inequality (11), if n = 1
αεγ2
·polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
γ ,
1
ε
)
then with probability at least 1−β/4,
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
≤ α
4
.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Theorem 5 (Privacy guarantee). Algorithm Aα,β,ε,γ is (ε, 0)-differentially private.
Proof of Theorem 5. The sensitivity of the utility function is
∆u = max
w∈W
max
Z,Z′∈(X×{±1})n
Z∼Z′
|u(Z,w) − u(Z ′,w)| ≤ 1
n
.
It follows by Lemma 4 that ME is (ε, 0)-DP.
By Lemma 1, (ε, 0)-differential privacy is closed under post-processing. Therefore it suffices to
show that an algorithm N that is the same as Aα,β,ε,γ except that it returns wˆ instead of wˆ⊤A, is
(ε, 0)-DP.
Let S and S′ be two neighboring sample sets such that S = S′ \ {(x′, y′)} ∪ {(x, y)}. Let
U =
{
± 1√
m
}m×d
. If we fix a matrix A ∈ U , the sample sets S and S′ would correspond to ME ’s
inputs SA and S
′
A = SA \ {(x′A, y′)} ∪ {(xA, y)}, respectively. For any measurable set R ⊆ Rm, it
holds that
Pr[N (S) ∈ R] =
∑
A∈U
Pr[A] · Pr[ME(SA) ∈ R | A]
≤
∑
A∈U
Pr[A] · exp(ε) Pr[ME(S′A) ∈ R | A] (since ME is (ε, 0)-DP)
= exp(ε)
∑
A∈U
Pr[A] · Pr[ME(S′A) ∈ R | A]
= exp(ε) Pr[N (S′) ∈ R].
Therefore, N is (ε, 0)-DP, and so is Aα,β,ε,γ.
5 A Sample Complexity Lower Bound for Pure Differential Privacy
In this section we prove a lower bound on the sample complexity of any (ε, 0)-differentially private
algorithm for learning a large-margin halfspace.
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Theorem 6. Any (ε, 0)-differentially private ( 110 ,
1
10 , γ)-learner for halfspaces in R
Ω(1/γ2) requires
Ω
(
1/εγ2
)
samples.
Proof. Our proof uses a standard packing argument. We construct distributions D(1), . . . ,D(K) over
Bd2 × {±1} for d = 1/1000γ2 and K = 2d/20. We will construct these distributions so that no
classifier is simultaneously accurate for two distinct distributions D(i) and D(j). This will imply
that n = Ω(log(K)/ε) = Ω(1/εγ2) samples are necessary to achieve (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
Each distribution D(i) is defined with respect to a halfspace w(i) ∈ {±1/√d}d, and has margin
γ with respect to this halfspace. That is
Pr
(x,y)∼D(i)
[y · 〈w(i),x〉 ≥ γ] = 1.
In addition, x is distributed uniformly at random on the remaining surface of Bd2 so that is does not
violate the margin and y = sign(〈w(i),x〉). Formally, if U denotes the uniform distribution on Bd2
and fU is its density function, then the probability density function of X where (X, y) ∼ D(i), is
fX(x
′) =
{
fU(x
′)/Prx∼U [|〈w(i),x〉| ≥ γ], if |〈w(i),x′〉| ≥ γ
0, otherwise.
Using standard constructions of error correcting codes, there exists a set w(1), . . . ,w(K) such
that the Hamming distance of any pair i 6= j, is Ham(w(i),w(j)) ≥ d/10. This implies that
〈w(i),w(j)〉 ≤ 4/5.
Let {w(1), . . . ,w(K)} be such a set and let D(1), . . . ,D(K) be the resulting distributions. The
crux of the proof is in establishing the following claim about this set of distributions. For each
distribution D(i), we define the set
G(i) =
{
wˆ ∈ Bd2 : errD(i)(wˆ) ≤
1
10
}
of all classifiers that have error at most 1/10 on the distribution D(i).
Claim 6.1. For every i 6= j, G(i) and G(j) are disjoint.
Using this claim, we can complete the proof as follows. Let S(1) ∼ (D(i))n denote a random
iid sample of n examples from D(i). Let A be an (ε, 0)-differentially private ( 110 , 110 , γ) learner. By
privacy and accuracy, we have for every i ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,K}
Pr[A(S(1)) ∈ G(i)] ≥ exp(−nε) Pr[A(S(1)) ∈ G(1)] ≥ 9
10
exp(−nε).
Since the sets G(i) are disjoint,
Pr[A(S(1)) /∈ G(1)] ≥
K∑
i=2
Pr[A(S(1)) ∈ G(i)] ≥
K∑
i=2
9
10
exp(−nε) = 9
10
(K − 1) exp(−nε).
Since, by accuracy, Pr[A(S(1)) /∈ G(1)] ≤ 110 , it follows that
9
10
(K − 1) exp(−nε) ≤ 1
10
Rearranging, and substituting our choice of K, we conclude n = Ω(1/εγ2).
Let us now prove Claim 6.1, which will complete the proof.
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Proof of Claim 6.1. We will show that for an arbitrary wˆ ∈ Bd2 , and every i 6= j, if errD(i)(wˆ) ≤ 1/10
then errD(j)(wˆ) > 1/10. Let Ui be the distribution over Bd2 × {±1} such that (x, y) ∼ Ui if x ∼ U
is uniform over the unit sphere in Rd and y = sign(〈w(i),x〉). Define the probability
pγ = Pr
x∼U
[|〈w,x〉| < γ]
of a uniformly distributed point on Bd2 lying within margin γ of a unit vector w. Probability pγ
remains unchanged if we replace w with any other unit vector and, more specifically,
pγ = Pr
(x,y)∼Ui
[|〈w(i),x〉| < γ]
holds for all Ui, i ∈ [K].
The next lemma will allow us to show that Ui is not too far from D
(i).
Lemma 5. If d = 1
1000γ2
then pγ ≤ 0.2.
Proof. Consider the following sampling process from the uniform distribution on the sphere: choose
each coordinate xi ∼ N (0, 1) and normalize with ‖x‖2. By the symmetric property of multi-
dimensional gaussian vectors, we know that the projection of x on a unit vector w is distributed
as x1/‖x‖2, where x1 ∼ N (0, 1) is the first coordinate of x and ‖x‖22 ∼ χ˜2(d) is the square of the
normalization factor. The probability of a point having margin more than γ from w is:
1− pγ = Pr
x∼U
[ |x1|
‖x‖2 ≥ γ
]
≥ Pr
x∼U
[(
|x1| ≥ 1
10
)
∧
(
‖x‖2 ≤ 1
10γ
)]
= 1− Pr
x∼U
[(
|x1| < 1
10
)
∨
(
‖x‖2 >
√
10d
)]
(d = 1
1000γ2
)
≥ 1− Pr
x1∼N (0,1)
[
|x1| < 1
10
]
− Pr
‖x‖22∼χ˜2(d)
[‖x‖22 > 10d]
By the tables of the standard normal distribution we have that Pr
x1∼N (0,1)
[|x1| < 110] ≤ 0.08. Also,
the mean of a χ˜2(d) distributed variable is d. By Markov’s inequality, it follows that
Pr
‖x‖22∼χ˜2(d)
[‖x‖22 > 10d] ≤ d/10d = 1/10.
Thus, pγ ≤ 0.18.
We can apply the preceding lemma to relate errUi(wˆ) to errD(i)(wˆ). Specifically, for any wˆ with
errD(i)(wˆ) ≤ 0.10, it holds that:
errUi(wˆ) = Pr
(x,y)∼Ui
[sign(〈wˆ,x〉) 6= sign(〈w(i),x〉)]
≤ Pr
(x,y)∼Ui
[sign(〈wˆ,x〉) 6= sign(〈w(i),x〉) | |〈w(i),x〉| ≥ γ] · Pr
(x,y)∼Ui
[|〈w(i),x〉| ≥ γ]
+ Pr
(x,y)∼Ui
[|〈w(i),x〉| < γ]
≤ 0.1 + 0.2 = 0.3
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Therefore,
errUi(wˆ) ≤ 0.3. (12)
Next we will argue that the same vector wˆ cannot have low error with respect to some other
distribution Uj . Fix any two vectors w
(i),w(j) as in our construction. Consider the plane defined
by these vectors and let θ be their angle. It holds that
Pr
x∼U
[sign(〈w(i),x〉) = sign(〈w(j),x〉)] = 2θ
2π
=
θ
π
=
cos−1(〈w(i),w(j)〉)
π
.
Since Ham(w(i),w(j)) ≥ d/10, 〈w(i),w(j)〉 ≤ 1d(9d/10 − d/10) = 810 . Thus,
Pr
x∼U
[sign(〈w(i),x〉) = sign(〈w(j),x〉)] ≤ cos
−1(8/10)
π
= 0.21
For the error of wˆ on distribution Uj it holds that:
Pr
(x,y)∼Uj
[sign(〈wˆ,x〉) = sign(〈w(j),x〉)]
≤ Pr
(x,y)∼Uj
[sign(〈wˆ,x〉) 6= sign(〈w(i),x〉)] + Pr
(x,y)∼Uj
[sign(〈w(j),x〉) = sign(〈w(i),x〉)]
≤ 0.3 + 0.21 = 0.51 (by (12))
Therefore,
errUj(wˆ) ≥ 0.49. (13)
Once again, we can relate this to the error on the distribution D(j) as follows.
Pr
(x,y)∼D(j)
[sign(〈wˆ,x〉) 6= sign(〈w(j),x〉)]
= Pr
(x,y)∼Uj
[sign(〈wˆ,x〉) 6= sign(〈w(j),x〉) | |〈w(j),x〉| ≥ γ] · Pr
(x,y)∼Uj
[|〈w(j),x〉| ≥ γ]
≥ Pr
(x,y)∼Uj
[sign(〈wˆ,x〉) 6= sign(〈w(j),x〉)] − Pr
(x,y)∼Uj
[|〈w(j),x〉| < γ]
≥ 0.49 − pγ ≥ 0.29 (by (13))
Therefore, errD(j)(wˆ) ≥ 0.29. Thus, for any wˆ, if errD(i)(wˆ) ≤ 0.1 then errD(j)(wˆ) ≥ 0.29.
This completes the proof of the lower bound.
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A Algorithm and proofs of Section 3
A.1 Differentially Private Empirical Risk Minimization Algorithm F
A complete algorithm, deploying the differentially private stochastic gradient descent algorithm
by Bassily et al. [2014], is presented below in Algorithm 3. We denote by ΠC(·) the euclidean
projection on C and by ‖C‖2 the diameter of C.
Algorithm 3 Aα,β,ε,δ,γ(S)
1: Choose a random matrix A ∈ Rm×d, where m = O
(
log(1/βJL)
γ2
)
, βJL = αβ
2/64n, and
Aij =
{
+1/
√
m w.p. 1/2
−1/√m w.p. 1/2.
2: Define SA ← {(Ax/‖Ax‖2, y) | (x, y) ∈ S}.
3: Define the hypothesis set C ← Bm2 .
4: Define the 10086γ -Lipschitz loss function ℓ : C × (Bm2 × {±1})→ R as
ℓ(w; (x, y)) = 1
{
y · 〈w,x〉 < 96γ
100
}
·
(
96
86
− y · 〈w,x〉
86γ/100
)
.
5: Let wˆ← F(SA, ℓ, (ε, δ), C).
6: return wˆ⊤A.
7: procedure F(D, ℓ, (ε, δ), C)
8: for i = 1 to ⌈log(8/β)⌉ do
9: wˆ(i) ← ANoise-GD(D, ℓ, (ε/⌈log(8/β)⌉, δ/⌈log(8/β)⌉), C)
10: W ← {wˆ(1), . . . , wˆ(⌈log(8/β)⌉)}
11: return wˆ←ME(D,−ℓ,W)
12: procedure ANoise-GD(D, ℓ, (ε′, δ′), C)
13: Noise variance σ2 ← 32L2n2 log(n/δ′) log(1/δ′)
ε′2
, where L is the Lipschitz constant of ℓ.
14: Learning rate function η : [n2]→ R: η(t) = ‖C‖2√
t(n2L2+mσ2)
.
15: Choose a point from C, w1.
16: for t = 1 to n2 − 1 do
17: Pick (x, y) ∼u D with replacement.
18: wt+1 ← ΠC(wt − η(t)[n∇ℓ(wt; (x, y)) + bt]), where bt ∼ N (0, Imσ2).
19: return wn2 .
To achieve a high-probability guarantee, algorithm F runs ANoise–GD ⌈log(8/β)⌉ times, with
privacy parameters ε/⌈log(8/β)⌉ and δ/⌈log(8/β)⌉, and uses the Exponential Mechanism to pick
the best hypothesis wˆ, as described in Appendix D of Bassily et al. [2014].
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
We state Lemma 3 again for convenience.
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Lemma 6 (Lemma 3). For every given matrix A, let GA ⊆ X ×{±1} be the set of data points (x, y)
that satisfy the following two statements:
(i)
∣∣‖Ax‖22 − ‖x‖22∣∣ ≤ γ100‖x‖22 and
(ii) w∗A =
Aw∗
‖Aw∗‖2 has margin at least 96γ/100 on (xA, y), i.e. y · 〈w∗A,xA〉 ≥ 96γ/100.
It holds that
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) ∈ GA] ≥ 1− 4βJL.
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2,
∣∣‖Au‖22 − ‖u‖22∣∣ ≤ γ100‖u‖22
holds for a point u ∈ Rd with probability at least 1−βJL. By union bound, it holds simultaneously
for all points x+w∗, x−w∗, x, and w∗, with probability at least 1− 4βJL. Under this condition,
statement (i) is true and for y = 1 we have:
〈w∗,x〉 = 1
4
‖ x+w∗‖22 −
1
4
‖ x−w∗‖22
≤ 1
4
(
1− γ100
)‖ A(x+w∗)‖22 − 14(1 + γ100)‖ A(x−w
∗)‖22
=
1
4
(
1− γ2
1002
)[(1 + γ
100
)
‖A(x+w∗)‖22 −
(
1− γ
100
)
‖A(x −w∗)‖22
]
=
1
1− γ2
1002
(
1
4
‖ Ax+Aw∗‖22 −
1
4
‖ Ax−Aw∗‖22
)
+
γ
100
4
(
1− γ2
1002
)(‖ Ax+Aw∗‖22 + ‖ Ax−Aw∗‖22)
=
1
1− γ2
1002
〈Aw∗, Ax〉 +
γ
100
2
(
1− γ2
1002
)(‖ Ax‖22 + ‖ Aw∗‖22)
≤ 1
1− γ2
1002
〈Aw∗, Ax〉 +
γ
100
(
1 + γ100
)
1− γ2
1002
Equivalently 〈Aw∗, Ax〉 ≥
(
1− γ2
1002
)
〈w∗,x〉 − γ100
(
1 + γ100
)
. Since y = 1 and 〈w∗,x〉 = y ·
〈w∗,x〉 ≥ γ, it follows that:
y · 〈Aw∗, Ax〉 ≥
(
1− γ
2
1002
)
γ − γ
100
(
1 +
γ
100
)
≥ 98γ
100
Therefore, for y = 1,
y · 〈w∗A,xA〉 = y ·
〈
Aw∗
‖Aw∗‖2 ,
Ax
‖Ax‖2
〉
≥
98γ
100
1 + γ100
≥ 96γ
100
.
The proof for y = −1 is similar. We conclude that with probability at least 1−4βJL, statements
(i) and (ii) are true.
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B Proof of Sample Complexity: (ε, 0)-DP
Theorem 7 (Sample Complexity, Theorem 4). Algorithm Aα,β,ε,γ is an (α, β, γ)-learner with sample
complexity
n =
1
αεγ2
· polylog
(
1
α
,
1
β
,
1
ε
,
1
γ
)
.
Proof of Theorem 4. As in the previous section, the first step of the algorithm is to sample matrix
A uniformly at random from U =
{
± 1√
m
}m×d
. From Lemma 3, it follows that:
E
A
[
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) /∈ GA]
]
≤ 4βJL
And, by Markov’s inequality,
Pr
A
[
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) /∈ GA] ≥ β′
]
≤
E
A
[
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) /∈ GA]
]
β′
≤ 4βJL
β′
.
We set β′ = αβ/4n. Then, substituting βJL = αβ
2
64n , we get that with probability at least 1−β/4,
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) ∈ GA] ≥ 1− β′.
Therefore, with probability 1 − β/4, the sampled matrix A satisfies the above inequality, that
is, a point (x, y) ∼ D is in GA with probability at least 1 − β′. Furthermore, by union bound,
∀(x, y) ∈ S it holds that (x, y) ∈ GA, with probability at least 1− nβ′ ≥ 1− β/4.
For the remainder of the proof, we condition on the event that
1. Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) ∈ GA] ≥ 1− β′ holds for A and
2. S ⊆ GA, that is, w∗A has margin at least 96γ/100 on SA.
This event occurs with probability at least 1− β/4 − β/4 = 1− β/2.
Claim 7.1. If n = 1αεγ2 ·polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
, then with probability 1−β/4, for hypothesis wˆ returned
by the Exponential Mechanism it holds that
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
≤ α
4
. (14)
Proof of Claim 7.1. Every point in Bm2 is within γ/10 from a center of W. Let w∗c be the center
within γ/10 from w∗A, that is,
‖w∗A −w∗c‖2 ≤ γ/10. (15)
Recall that in our conditioned probability space,
y · 〈w∗A,xA〉 ≥ 96γ/100 (16)
holds for all (xA, y) ∈ SA. Therefore, for all (xA, y) ∈ SA,
y · 〈w∗c ,xA〉 = y · 〈w∗A,xA〉 − y · 〈w∗A −w∗c ,xA〉
≥ y · 〈w∗A,xA〉 − ‖w∗A −w∗c‖2 · ‖xA‖2
≥ 96γ/100 − γ/10 = 86γ/10 > γ/10. (by inequalities (15), (16))
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It follows that
max
w∈W
u(SA,w) ≥ u(SA,w∗c) = −
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈w,xA〉 < γ
10
}
= 0. (17)
By Lemma 4 and inequality (17), with probability at least 1− β/4, it holds that:
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
≤ 2
nε
(ln(|W|) + ln(4/β)) (18)
It is a well-known result that the covering number of an m-dimensional unit ball by balls of
radius γ/10 is at most O
((
1
γ/10
)m)
. Therefore, substituting m = O
(
log(n/αβ)
γ2
)
, it follows that
ln |W| = 1
γ2
· polylog
(
n,
1
α
,
1
β
,
1
γ
)
.
Thus, by inequality (18), if n = 1αεγ2 ·polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
γ ,
1
ε
)
then with probability at least 1−β/4,
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ
10
}
≤ α
4
.
This concludes the proof of the claim.
Claim 7.2. If n = 1
αεγ2
·polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
, then with probability 1−β/2, the error of the returned
classifier wˆ⊤A on distribution D is
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[y · 〈wˆ⊤A,x〉 < 0] ≤ α. (19)
Proof of Claim 7.2. Let DA denote the probability distribution with domain Bm2 ×{±1}, from which
a sample (xA, y) ∈ SA is drawn. Let us also denote by D|GA distribution D restricted on GA. In
our conditioned probability space, SA ∼ DnA, where the probability density function of DA would
be defined as
Pr
(xA,y)∼DA
[xA = x
′ ∧ y = y′] = Pr
(x,y)∼D|GA
[
Ax
‖Ax‖2 = x
′ ∧ y = y′
]
.
Let H = {h : {xA | (x, y) ∈ GA} → {±1} s.t. h(x) = sign(〈w,x〉) for some w ∈ Bm2 } be a con-
cept class of threshold functions in Bm2 . By Theorem 3.4 of Anthony and Bartlett [2009], VCdim(H) =
m+ 1.
By the generalization bound of Theorem 5.7 of Anthony and Bartlett [2009], it holds that:
Pr
SA∼DnA

∃h ∈ H : errDA(h) > 2 · 1n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1{h(xA) 6= y}+ α
4

 ≤ 4ΠH(2n) exp(−αn/32)
where the growth function ΠH(2n) ≤ (2n)m+1 +1, by Theorem 3.7 of Anthony and Bartlett [2009].
Usingm = O
(
log(1/αβ)
γ2
)
, it holds that if n = 1
αγ2
·polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
γ
)
then 4ΠH(2n) exp(−αn/32) ≤
β/4. Therefore, with probability at least 1− β/4,
errDA(fwˆ) ≤ 2 ·
1
n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1{y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < 0}+ α
4
(20)
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By Claim 7.1, 1n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1{y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < 0} ≤ 1n
∑
(xA,y)∈SA
1
{
y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < γ10
} ≤ α4 holds with
probability 1− β/4, if n = 1αεγ2 · polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
δ ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
.
Therefore, by inequality (20), if n = 1αεγ2 · polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
δ ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
, then with probability at least
1− β/4− β/4 = 1− β/2,
errDA(fwˆ) ≤ 2 ·
α
4
+
α
4
=
3α
4
.
Equivalently, with probability at least 1− β/2,
Pr
(x,y)∼D|GA
[y · 〈wˆ⊤A,x〉 < 0] = Pr
(xA,y)∼DA
[y · 〈wˆ,xA〉 < 0] = errDA(fwˆ) ≤
3α
4
.
Since, by Condition 1., Pr
(x,y)∼D
[(x, y) /∈ GA] ≤ β′ ≤ α4 , it follows that with probability at least
1− β/2,
Pr
(x,y)∼D
[y · 〈wˆ⊤A,x〉 < 0] ≤ Pr
(x,y)∼D|GA
[y · 〈wˆ⊤A,x〉 < 0] · (1− β′) + 1 · β′
≤ 3α
4
· (1− β′) + β′
≤ 3α
4
+
α
4
≤ α.
This completes the proof of the claim.
Accounting for the probability that we are not in the conditioned space, we conclude that if
n = 1
αεγ2
·polylog
(
1
α ,
1
β ,
1
δ ,
1
ε ,
1
γ
)
, then with probability at least 1−β/2−β/2 = 1−β, errD(fwˆ⊤A) ≤ α.
This completes the proof of the theorem.
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